State of Haryana vsJai Singh 2025 INSC 1122 -Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act - Stare Decisis

Case Name and Neutral Citation

• Case Name: The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
• Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1122

Coram (Judges)

• B.R. Gavai, Chief Justice of India
• Prashant Kumar Mishra, J
• K.V. Viswanathan, J

Judgment Date

• Date: September 16, 2025

Caselaws and Citations Referred

• Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab and Others (1964 SCC OnLine SC 182 : (1965) 1 SCR 82)
• Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Another (1966 SCC OnLine SC 192 : (1967) 2 SCR 143)
• Bhagat Ram and Others v. State of Punjab and Others (1966 SCC OnLine SC 264 : (1967) 2 SCR 165)
• Sarat Chandra Mishra and Others v. State of Orissa and Others ((2006) 1 SCC 638)
• Ramesh Chand Daga v. Rameshwari Bai ((2005) 4 SCC 772)
• Gajraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. and Others ((2001) 5 SCC 762)
• State of Punjab v. Gurjant Singh (Civil Appeal Nos. 5709-5714 of 2001)
• K.T. Plantation Private Limited and Another v. State of Karnataka ((2011) 9 SCC 1)
• Suraj Bhan and Others v. State of Haryana and Another (CWP No. 314 of 2001, Punjab & Haryana High Court, 22 July 2016)
• Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay ((1974) 2 SCC 402)
• Waman Rao v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 271)

Statutes/Laws Referred

• Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961
• Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992
• East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948)
• Article 31-A of the Constitution of India
• Article 300-A of the Constitution of India
• Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India
• Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949
• Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Act 17 of 1887)

What is the core dispute in the "State of Haryana vs Jai Singh" case?

The central conflict revolves around amendments made to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, by the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992. These amendments aimed to expand the definition of "shamilat deh" (common village land) to include lands reserved for common purposes during consolidation proceedings, even those not explicitly utilized. The respondent-landowners challenged these amendments, arguing that they amounted to compulsory acquisition of their privately contributed land without compensation, violating their constitutional rights, particularly under Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. The State of Haryana contended that the amendments were merely clarificatory and intended as agrarian reform to strengthen Gram Panchayat control, and that the landowners had already lost their rights under earlier consolidation acts.

What is "shamilat deh" and "bachat land" in the context of this case?

"Shamilat deh" refers to common village lands. Historically, this included land meant for the common purposes of village inhabitants, often formed from a common pool of land contributed by landowners. The Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 sought to broaden this definition to include lands reserved for common purposes under Section 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, irrespective of whether they were actually used for those purposes.

"Bachat land" refers to the unutilized surplus land that was contributed by proprietors on a pro-rata basis for common purposes during consolidation proceedings, but was not ultimately reserved or earmarked for a specific common purpose in the consolidation scheme. The key contention for landowners is that this "bachat land" should revert to them, as it was neither utilized nor specifically designated for common use by the Panchayat.

How does Article 31-A of the Indian Constitution relate to the case, especially the second proviso?

Article 31-A of the Constitution of India provides protection to certain laws from being challenged on the grounds of inconsistency with Articles 14, 19, or 31, particularly those related to agrarian reform and the acquisition or modification of rights in estates. The second proviso to Article 31-A(1) is crucial here. It states that if a law provides for the acquisition by the State of any estate, and if land within that estate is held by a person under personal cultivation and is within their ceiling limit, the State cannot acquire it unless the law provides for compensation at a rate not less than the market value. The landowners argued that the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992, by vesting "bachat land" with the Gram Panchayat without compensation, amounted to "acquisition by the State" and thus violated this second proviso. The Court in "Ajit Singh" and "Bhagat Ram" cases clarified that if the State in substance acquired all rights in land for its own purposes, even if title remained with the owner, it would be considered "acquisition" under this proviso, triggering the need for compensation.

What was the Supreme Court's initial ruling in this specific case ("State of Haryana v. Jai Singh") and why was it reviewed?

Initially, the Supreme Court, in its judgment and order dated April 7, 2022, allowed the appeals filed by the State and Panchayats, holding that Act 9 of 1992 was valid and did not suffer from constitutional infirmity. The Court ruled that all land reserved for common purposes, even if by a pro rata cut, had to be utilized by the Gram Panchayat, and no part could be re-partitioned among proprietors. This judgment effectively dismissed the writ petitions filed by the landowners before the High Court.

However, a review petition was filed, and after thorough consideration, the Supreme Court, by an order dated May 16, 2024, allowed the Review Petition, recalled its earlier judgment of April 7, 2022, and restored the appeal for fresh hearing. This indicates that the Court acknowledged potential errors or new considerations warranting a re-examination of its previous decision.

What was the significance of the "Bhagat Ram" and "Ajit Singh" Constitution Bench judgments in this context?

The "Bhagat Ram" and "Ajit Singh" judgments are highly significant because they are Constitution Bench rulings that interpreted Article 31-A and the Consolidation Act of 1948.

• Ajit Singh (supra) established that while adjustment of land for common village purposes (like paths, schools) where title remained with the proprietary body and proprietors also benefited was not "acquisition by the State" for compensation purposes, a broader interpretation of "acquisition by the State" applied if the State, in substance, acquired all rights for its own purposes, even if formal title remained with the owner.
• Bhagat Ram (supra) specifically addressed the reservation of land for the income of the Panchayat. The Court held that if land was reserved solely to generate income for the Panchayat (which falls under the definition of "State" for Article 12 purposes), it constituted "acquisition by the State" under the second proviso to Article 31-A, thereby necessitating compensation at market value. Crucially, "Bhagat Ram" also held that rights of holders are not modified or extinguished until possession of the holdings allotted under the scheme has actually changed, meaning simply finalizing repartition was not equivalent to "acquisition."

These judgments, delivered on the same day, provide the foundational legal framework for determining when land contributed for common purposes amounts to "acquisition by the State" and triggers the compensation requirement, particularly distinguishing between land used directly for common village facilities and land reserved for the Panchayat's income.

What is the "doctrine of stare decisis" and how was it applied by the High Court in this case?

The doctrine of stare decisis is a legal principle that emphasizes stability and predictability in the legal system by requiring courts to follow precedents established by previous decisions. It mandates that a view consistently upheld by courts over a long period should be followed, unless it is demonstrably erroneous, unjust, or causes public hardship or inconvenience.

In this case, the Full Bench of the High Court, in its impugned judgment and final order, applied the doctrine of stare decisis. It noted that the Punjab and Haryana High Court had consistently taken the view in over 100 judgments that "bachat land" (unutilized land after providing for common purposes) vests with the proprietors and not with the Gram Panchayat. Given this long-standing and consistent judicial precedent, the High Court held that such a view should not be overturned. The Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's application of this doctrine.

What was the High Court's final decision regarding "bachat land" and its reasoning?

The Full Bench of the High Court partly allowed the writ petitions filed by the landowners. It distinguished between land genuinely reserved for common purposes under a consolidation scheme (which vests with the Government or Gram Panchayat) and "bachat land." The High Court held that lands contributed by proprietors on a pro-rata basis but not reserved or earmarked for specific common purposes in a scheme, known as "bachat land," would not vest with either the State or the Gram Panchayat. Instead, it would continue to be owned by the proprietors of the village in proportion to their original contribution.

The High Court's reasoning was primarily based on the Supreme Court's judgment in "Bhagat Ram (supra)," which held that if land was not reserved for common purposes and its vesting would amount to compulsory acquisition within the ceiling limit without compensation, it would offend the second proviso to Article 31-A. The High Court further fortified its decision by invoking the doctrine of stare decisis, citing a consistent line of over 100 judgments by the Punjab and Haryana High Court supporting this position regarding "bachat land."

What was the ultimate outcome of the Supreme Court's re-hearing of the appeal after the review was allowed?

After the review petition was allowed and the appeal was heard afresh, the Supreme Court found "no merit in the appeal of the State." Consequently, the appeal filed by the State of Haryana was dismissed. This outcome indicates that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the High Court's judgment, which had ruled against the State regarding the vesting of "bachat land" and had partly allowed the writ petitions of the respondent-landowners. The dismissal of the State's appeal implies that the High Court's decision, particularly its stance on "bachat land" reverting to the proprietors and the application of stare decisis, stood affirmed.