Laxman Jangde vs State of Chhattisgarh - S.376AB IPC - POCSO Act

Case Name and Neutral Citation

• Case Name: Laxman Jangde vs State of Chhattisgarh

Coram

• Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
• Hon’ble Mr. Justice Joymalya Bagchi

Judgment Date

• 10th September, 2025

Statutes/Laws Referred

• Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC):
• • Section 376 AB (Rape of a woman under twelve years of age)
  • Section 354 (Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty)
• Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act):
• • Section 6 (Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault)
  • Section 3(c) (Definition of penetrative sexual assault)
  • Section 7 (Sexual assault)
  • Section 9(m) (Aggravated sexual assault)
  • Section 10 (Punishment for aggravated sexual assault)
  • Section 42 (Alternate punishment provision)
• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.):
• • Section 164 (Recording of confessions and statements)

1. What was the initial conviction and sentence in the case of Laxman Jangde?

Laxman Jangde was initially convicted by the Trial Court under Section 376 AB of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The High Court upheld this conviction and sentence. Keeping in view Section 42 of the POCSO Act (which allows for alternate punishment), the sentencing was done only under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The appellant was sentenced to undergo twenty years of Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) along with a fine of Rs.50,000/-, with an additional year of R.I. in default of payment.

2. What was the appellant's main argument against the conviction?

The appellant's senior counsel argued that the evidence, including the FIR, the victim's statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., and her deposition during trial, did not prove an offence under Section 376 AB of the IPC or Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The allegation was that the appellant touched the victim's private parts and put his hand in his own sexual organs, but there was no actual penetration. Therefore, it was contended that the acts did not constitute "rape" as defined under Section 375 of the IPC or "penetrative sexual assault" under Section 3(c) of the POCSO Act. The appellant argued that, at worst, it could be a case under Section 354 of the IPC and Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act, considering he had already spent five and a half years in prison.

3. How did the Supreme Court define "rape" and "penetrative sexual assault" in the context of the IPC and POCSO Act?

The Supreme Court referenced Section 375 of the IPC, which defines "rape" primarily through various forms of "penetration," including penile penetration, insertion of objects or body parts, manipulation causing penetration, and oral application to specific body parts. It also highlighted Section 3(c) of the POCSO Act, which defines "penetrative sexual assault" similarly by focusing on manipulation that causes penetration into specific body parts of a child. The Court emphasized that for these sections to apply, there must be a clear element of "penetration."

4. What was the respondent-State's counter-argument?

The learned counsel for the respondent-State maintained that the appellant had committed an offence as defined under Section 375 of the IPC and Section 3(c) of the POCSO Act. They argued that because the offense was committed against a girl under twelve years of age, the appellant deserved no sympathy from the Court, and both the conviction and sentence should not be interfered with.

5. What was the Supreme Court's finding regarding the evidence presented?

The Supreme Court found "substance" in the appellant's argument. After reviewing the evidence and other materials on record, the Court concluded that the alleged acts did not satisfy the ingredients of either Section 375 of the IPC or Section 3(c) of the POCSO Act because there was no evidence of penetrative sexual assault. This conclusion was based on the victim's statements on three different occasions, the mother's statement, and the medical report, all of which indicated touching of private parts rather than penetration.

6. To what lesser charges did the Supreme Court modify the conviction?

The Supreme Court modified the conviction of the appellant to charges under Section 354 of the IPC and Section 10 of the POCSO Act. Section 354 of the IPC deals with "Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty," while Section 10 of the POCSO Act pertains to "Punishment for sexual assault" (which covers acts without penetration, as defined in Section 7 of the POCSO Act, and aggravated sexual assault on a child below twelve years, as per Section 9(m)).

7. What was the modified sentence imposed by the Supreme Court?

Following the modification of the conviction, the appellant's sentence was also modified. He was sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) of five years under Section 354 of the IPC and seven years under Section 10 of the POCSO Act. These sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The fine amount of Rs.50,000/- was retained and ordered to be paid to the victim as compensation within two months.

8. What is the significance of this judgment?

This judgment clarifies the distinction between "penetrative sexual assault" (as defined under Section 375 IPC and Section 3(c) POCSO Act) and "sexual assault" or "aggravated sexual assault" without penetration (as defined under Section 354 IPC and Sections 7, 9(m), and 10 POCSO Act). It underscores the importance of thoroughly examining evidence to determine if the specific legal ingredients of severe charges like rape are met, particularly the element of penetration. The ruling emphasizes that actions involving touching private parts, even with sexual intent, may not always fall under the most stringent provisions if actual penetration is not proven.