Narayan Yadav vs State of Chhattisgarh 2025 INSC 927 - Evidence Act - IPC - Confessional FIR

Indian Evidence Act 1872 - An FIR of a confessional nature made by an accused person is inadmissible in evidence against him, except to the extent that it shows he made a statement soon after the offence, thereby identifying him as the maker of the report, which is admissible as evidence of his conduct under Section 8 of the Act of 1872. Additionally, any information furnished by him that leads to the discovery of a fact is admissible under Section 27 of the Act of 1872. However, a non-confessional FIR is admissible against the accused as an admission under Section 21 of the Act of 1872 and is relevant - A statement contained in the FIR furnished by one of the accused in the case cannot, in any manner, be used against another accused. Even as against the accused who made it, the statement cannot be used if it is inculpatory in nature nor can it be used for the purpose of corroboration or contradiction unless its maker offers himself as a witness in the trial. The very limited use of it is, as an admission under Section 21 of the Act of 1872, against its maker alone, and only if the admission does not amount to a confession. (Para 23-24)

Indian Evidence Act 1872 - An expert witness is examined by the prosecution because of his specialized knowledge on certain subjects, which the judge may not be fully equipped to assess. The evidence of such an expert is of an advisory character. The credibility of the expert witness depends on the reasons provided in support of his conclusions, as well as the data and material forming the basis of those conclusions. An accused cannot be held guilty of the offence of murder solely on the basis of medical evidence on record. (Para 28)

Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 27 - The conditions necessary for the applicability of Section 27 are: i. That consequent to the information given by the accused, it led to the discovery of some fact; ii. The fact discovered must be one which was not within the knowledge of the police and the knowledge of the fact for the first time was derived from the information given by the accused; iii. The discovery of a fact which is the direct outcome of such information; iv. Only such portion of the information as connected with the said discovery is admissible; v. The discovery of the fact must relate to the commission of some offence.  (Para 33)

Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 8 - While the conduct of an accused may be a relevant fact under Section 8 of the Act of 1872, it cannot, by itself, serve as the sole basis for conviction, especially in a grave charge such as murder. Like any other piece of evidence, the conduct of the accused is merely one of the circumstances the court may consider, in conjunction with other direct or circumstantial evidence on record. (Para 36)

Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 299-304- whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is “murder” or “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, it will be convenient to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage is, whether the accused committed an act which caused the death of another person. Proof of a causal connection between the act of the accused and the resulting death leads to the second stage, for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 299 of the IPC. If the answer to this question is, prima facie, found in the affirmative, the next stage involves considering the application of Section 300 of the IPC. At this stage, the court must determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of “murder” contained in Section 300. If the answer to this is in the negative, the offence would be “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under either the first or the second part of Section 304, depending respectively on whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. However, if the answer is in the positive, but the case falls within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the Part I of Section 304 of the IPC. (Para 43)

Indian Penal Code 1860 - Exception 4 to Section 300 - The protection of Exception 4 may be invoked if death is caused: (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the deceased - The term “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC is not defined in the IPC. A fight necessarily involves two parties – it takes two to make a fight. The heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool, and in such case, the parties may have worked themselves into a fury due to a prior verbal altercation. A fight is a combat between two and more persons, whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what constitutes a “sudden quarrel”. This is a question of fact, and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not enough to show that there was a sudden quarrel and no premeditation. It must also be shown that the offender did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provision means “unfair advantage”. (Para 41-42) The first part of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC refers to the absence of premeditation in a sudden fight arising from a sudden quarrel in a heat of passion. However, it does not end there. The exception further requires that the offender must not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. (Para 49)

Indian Penal Code 1860 - Exception 1 and 4 to Section 300 - Both involve the absence of premeditation. However, while Exception 1 involves total deprivation of self-control, Exception 4 refers to that heat of passion which clouds a person’s sober reason and urges them to commit acts they would not otherwise commit. There is provocation in Exception 4, as there is in Exception 1, but the injury caused is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 addresses cases where, notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck or provocation given at the outset of the dispute, regardless of how the quarrel originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties’ places them on an equal footing with respect to guilt. (Para 40)