Supreme Court Daily Digest [9 January 2026]

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh 2026 INSC 47 -POCSO - Bail - Medical Age Determination

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 -POCSO Act - Bail ; Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015- JJ Act- Section 94 - Determination of age of the victim is a matter of trial and not at the stage of bail. If the age is under question, the bail Court may examine the documents produced to establish age, but it will not enter into the question of those documents being correct or not so - A medical determination of age of a victim cannot be resorted to as a matter of course, much less mandated. It can only be employed in a given circumstance when the other stipulations of Section 94 JJ Act are not/cannot be met. (Para 16-17) If the question of age is raised at the stage of bail, it is only open for the Court to, from the perusal of the documents, take a prima facie view as to the age of the victim, not one on the correctness of the documents since that would amount to a mini trial. (Para 18)

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 439- Court’s jurisdiction, i.e., either the Court of Sessions or the High Court under Section 439 CrPC is limited to adjudicating the question of the person concerned being released into society pending trial or whether they should continue to be incarcerated. (Para 11.2) Section 439 is limited to granting bail or anticipatory bail and requires the Court to consider only prima facie evidence, the risk of the accused absconding, tampering with evidence, or other relevant factors- The Court cannot undertake a mini trial at the bail stage. (Para 15.3)

POCSO Act - Romeo – Juliet clause - Misuse/misapplication of the POCSO Act to settle scores and by families in opposition to relationships between young people- Government of India, to consider initiation of steps as may be possible to curb this menace (1) the introduction of a Romeo – Juliet clause exempting genuine adolescent relationships from the stronghold of this law; (2) enacting a mechanism enabling the prosecution of those persons who, by the use of these laws seeks to settle scores etc. (Para 19)

POCSO Act - JJ Act - Unlike an offender who can claim benefit of juvenility at any point in time, even after completion of proceedings given the beneficial nature of the JJ Act, a victim of a crime cannot claim to be a juvenile at any point in time, for the charges against which an offender is tried, are intrinsically tied to the age of the victim.(Para 14.9)

JJ Act- The object of Section 9 is to ensure that no juvenile offender is tried as an adult merely due to an initial misclassification and to safeguard the rehabilitative and welfare-oriented spirit of the juvenile justice system by ensuring that every child in conflict with law is tried by the appropriate forum, i.e., the JJB. (Para 14.6)

Constitutional powers and Statutory Powers -Constitutional powers are sovereign, foundational, and insulated from the vicissitudes of ordinary legislation; they can neither be curtailed nor expanded by parliamentary enactment. Statutory powers, by contrast, are subordinate and mutable, existing at the pleasure of the Legislature, which may at any time amend, restrict, or repeal them through the ordinary legislative process. The constitutional power cannot overshadow the statutory power, enlarging its scope beyond what has been envisaged by the statute -while both powers rest with the High Court, one power cannot usurp the ambit of another, unless otherwise permitted by law. (Para 11.3)

Summary: The Supreme Court set aside an Allahabad High Court judgment that, while granting bail in a POCSO case, mandated medical age determination at the investigation’s outset and allowed bail courts to weigh age-document credibility. It held that bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC is limited, age determination of the victim must follow Section 94 JJ Act during trial (medical tests only if documents are unavailable), and bail courts cannot conduct a mini-trial or fuse constitutional powers into statutory proceedings. The Court preserved existing bail orders, prospectively nullified the High Court’s directions (including in Monish and Aman), and urged consideration of reforms like a Romeo–Juliet clause to prevent misuse of POCSO in consensual adolescent relationships.

X v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another; 2026 INSC 44 - POCSO Act - Bail

POCSO Act - Bail - Mere filing of a chargesheet does not, by itself, preclude consideration of an application for bail- However, the Court is duty-bound to have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence and the material collected during investigation- In offences involving sexual assault against children, the likelihood of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses constitutes a grave and legitimate concern. The safety of the victim and the need to preserve the purity of the trial process assume paramount importance. (Para 12-15)

Bail - Bail is not to be refused mechanically, it must not be granted on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring material evidence. (Para 16)

Summary: Supreme Court set aside the bail granted to accused in a POCSO case.

Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana; 2026 INSC 42- S.212 Companies Act - Cognizance Taking

Companies Act, 2013: Section 212, 213 447,448- Where the Special Court under the Companies Act is taking cognizance of an offence under a section in the Companies Act which, if proved, would make the person(s) ‘liable under Section 447’ or ‘liable for action under Section 447’, it must also invoke Section 447 with the corresponding section and in such a case, it must comply with the bar against taking cognizance as specified in the second proviso to Section 212(6) of the Companies Act (Para 59)- The offence under Section 448 is an offence ‘covered under Section 447’ of the Companies Act mentioned in Section 212(6), since the offence under Section 448 is inextricably linked to the punishment for ‘fraud’ as mentioned in Section 447 and as such, the second proviso to Section 212(6) of the Companies Act is attracted. (Para 33) The right recourse for a person, who makes an allegation of fraud in the affairs of a company is to file an application under Section 213 of the Companies Act before the NCLT upon satisfying the eligibility under Section 213(a) and 213(b) of the Companies Act. (Para 45)

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - Civil Nature- mere institution or pendency of civil proceedings between the parties cannot be a ground to quash the criminal proceedings instituted by filing a complaint case or to conclude that the dispute is purely civil in nature. (Para 55)

Legal Doctrines - anything that cannot be done directly, also cannot be done indirectly. (Para 43)

Summary- The Supreme Court quashed cognizance under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act, holding that offences “liable under Section 447” trigger the Section 212(6) bar and cannot proceed on a private complaint without an SFIO or authorised Central Government complaint. It directed transfer of the remaining IPC offences (Sections 420, 406, 426, 468, 470, 471, 120B) to a court of proper territorial jurisdiction, clarifying that civil/NCLT proceedings do not preclude criminal trial. The Court emphasized legislative intent post‑2015 amendment, aligned with High Court views, and instructed expeditious adjudication while making no findings on merits of the IPC allegations.

Roshini Devi v. State of Telangana 2026 INSC 41 - Preventive Detention - Bail Apprehension

Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders [Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders] Act, 1986 - Mere apprehension on the part of the detaining authority that in the event of the detenu being released on bail, she was likely to indulge in similar crimes that would be prejudicial to maintenance of public order would not be a sufficient ground to order her preventive detention - Mere reproduction of the expressions mentioned in Section 2(a) of the Act of 1986 in the order of detention would not be sufficient. The detention order ought to indicate the recording of subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority in that regard.- There is a fine distinction between “law and order” and “public order”. Mere registration of three offences by itself would not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order unless there is material to show that the narcotic drug dealt with by the detenu was in fact dangerous to public health under the Act of 1986.  (Para 9-10)

Summary: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of Roshini Devi, quashing her mother’s preventive detention under the Telangana Act of 1986 because the detaining authority failed to show how her alleged drug-related activities affected public order rather than merely law and order. The Court criticized reliance on bail apprehensions and past history without taking ordinary-law measures like bail cancellation, citing precedents that preventive detention is an extraordinary remedy requiring specific, relevant material and genuine subjective satisfaction. It set aside the High Court’s dismissal, ordered the detenu’s release if not wanted elsewhere, and emphasized the distinction between public order and law and order.

Sumit Bansal v. MGI Developers and Promoters 2026 INSC 40 - NI Act - Cheque Bounce -Multiple Cheques

Negotiable Instruments Act 1881- Section 138 - A separate cause of action arises upon each dishonour of a cheque provided the statutory sequence of presentation, dishonour, notice, and failure to pay is complete. The fact that multiple cheques arise from one transaction will not merge them into a single cause of action- [Context: In this case, the cheques forming the subject of the two complaints were distinct instruments drawn on different accounts, presented on different dates, dishonoured separately, and followed by independent statutory notices - SC held: The scheme of Section 138 of the NI Act does not bar prosecution in such circumstances.  Whether those cheques were issued as alternative or supplementary instruments, or represented fresh undertakings, is a disputed question of fact requiring evidence at the time of trial and cannot be resolved at the threshold.]

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 ; Negotiable Instruments Act 1881- Section 139 - The statutory presumption attached to the issuance of a cheque, being one made in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability, is required to be accorded due weight. Therefore, in circumstances where the accused approaches the Court seeking quashing of proceedings even before the commencement of trial, the Court must exercise circumspection and refrain from prematurely stifling the prosecution at the threshold, particularly by overlooking the legal presumption that operates in favour of the complainant. (Para 43) Whether those cheques were issued as alternative or supplementary instruments, or represented fresh undertakings, is a disputed question of fact requiring evidence at the time of trial and cannot be resolved at the threshold. Questions such as whether the firm’s cheques were issued in substitution of the personal cheques, whether the parties treated them as alternative securities, and whether both were intended to be simultaneously enforceable, are all mixed questions of fact. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.PC cannot be used to decide such disputed issues. (Para 34)

Negotiable Instruments Act 1881- Section 139- The burden of proving whether there exists any debt or liability is something which must be discharged in trial. A bare perusal of Section 139 of the NI Act would indicate that once a cheque is issued in discharge of liability and dishonoured, a presumption of liability in favour of the complainant arises. The accused person is then required to rebut the presumption by raising facts that either there was no debt or liability when the cheque was drawn, or the cheque was not drawn in discharge of liability, or notice was not served in time. (Para 42)

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - Even though the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.PC are very wide, its conferment requires the High Court to be more cautious and diligent. While examining any complaint or FIR, the High Court exercising its power under this provision cannot go embarking upon the genuineness of the allegations made. The Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not. (Para 28)

Summary: The Supreme Court addressed multiple Section 138 NI Act complaints arising from dishonoured cheques linked to a 2016 Agreement to Sell, where MGI Developers failed to execute sale deeds and issued both firm and personal cheques that were later returned unpaid. It held that each dishonour created a distinct cause of action, set aside the High Court’s quashing of Complaint Case No. 3298/2019, and allowed that case to proceed, while upholding the refusal to quash Complaint Case Nos. 2823/2019, 13508/2019, and 743/2020. The Court emphasized that disputed factual issues and the statutory presumption under Section 139 must be tested at trial, leaving all contentions open.

C.S. Prasad vs C. Satyakumar and Others; 2026 INSC 39 - S.482 CrPC - Quashing - Civil Suit - Delay

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - Civil Nature - Civil adjudication cannot always be treated as determinative of criminal culpability at the stage of quashment- Civil liability and criminal liability may arise from the same set of facts and that the pendency or conclusion of civil proceedings does not bar prosecution where the ingredients of a criminal offence are disclosed- Adjudication of forgery, cheating or use of forged documents in relation to a settlement deed will always carry a civil element. To permit quashing on the sole ground of a civil suit would encourage unscrupulous litigants to defeat criminal prosecution by instituting civil proceedings. (Para 26-28)

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 -Delay - Delay in filing a complaint, by itself, is never a ground for quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold. Whether the delay stands satisfactorily explained or whether it impacts the credibility of the prosecution, is a matter of appreciation of evidence before the Trial Court and not for summary determination by the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.PC.

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - Scope -Even though the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.PC are very wide, its conferment requires the High Courts to be more cautious and diligent. While examining any FIR, the High Court exercising its power under this provision cannot go embarking upon the genuineness of the allegations made. The High Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not and must not be concerned with the reliability, sufficiency, or acceptability of the evidence. (Para 24) High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 482 is bound to take the allegations (made in complaint) on its face value. Whether these allegations can ultimately be proved is a matter strictly within the province of the Trial Court (Para 25)-when a factual foundation for prosecution exists, criminal law cannot be short-circuited by invoking inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.PC. Where allegations require adjudication on evidence, the proper course is to permit the trial to proceed in accordance with law.  (Para 31)

Summary: The Supreme Court set aside the Madras High Court’s order quashing criminal proceedings against accused.

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra 2026 INSC 38 - Educational Courses - Admission -Legitimate Expectation

Educational Courses - Admission - While advertisements for private colleges explicitly state that admission does not grant a right to appointment, the absence of this specific disclaimer in government college advertisements does not mean a right to appointment is automatically implied. (Para 21)

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation - Two tests - (1) legitimacy of the expectation and (2) being denial of legitimate expectation that led to violation of Article 14. (Para 26)

Factual Summary: Supreme Court set aside Allahabad High Court orders that had directed Uttar Pradesh to appoint Ayurvedic Staff Nurse trainees, holding that mere admission and completion of training did not confer a right to appointment. It found that post-2011 policy changes allowing private institutions and the 2014 shift to UPSSSC recruitment, followed by 2021 service rules, required a competitive selection process, making the doctrine of legitimate expectation inapplicable.

Vijay Kumar v. State of Rajasthan - Criminal Trial Pending- Interim Orders

Criminal Trials - If criminal trials in such serious offences remain pending for years together on the strength of interim orders passed by the High Courts, it would lead to nothing but mockery of justice. Justice has to be done with all the parties. Justice cannot be done only with the accused persons. Justice has to be done even with the victim and the family members of the victim. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere- Chief Justices of all the High Courts requested to ensure that the petitions wherein interim orders are passed holding up the trials should be immediately taken up for hearing, more particularly in sensitive and serious matters like murder, dowry death, rape etc. (Para 29-30)

Context: Supreme Court of India dismissed SLP filed against High Court’s rejection of their 2003 criminal revision against framing charges under IPC Sections 498A and 304B in a dowry death case. Disturbed by a 23-year delay during which an interim stay halted the trial, the Court ordered the Rajasthan High Court’s Registrar General to send the full record and provide a year-wise breakup of criminal revision filings and disposals from 2001–2026, plus details of listings in this case. It also sought the State’s explanation for inaction, urged Chief Justices to promptly hear matters where interim orders stall serious trials, and listed the case for further orders on 15-01-2026.